The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan by Phelps, Glenn A. & Gates, John B.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 31 | Number 3 Article 1
1-1-1991
The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Glenn A. Phelps and John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and
Brennan, 31 Santa Clara L. Rev. 567 (1991).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss3/1
ARTICLES
THE MYTH OF JURISPRUDENCE: INTERPRETIVE
THEORY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS
OF JUSTICES REHNQUIST AND BRENNAN
Glenn A. Phelps* and John B. Gates**
I. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE MYTH OF
JURISPRUDENCE: THE APPEAL OF PRINCIPLE(S)?
The last twenty years have seen a remarkable flowering of
interest in the Constitution. Indeed, judging by the proportion
of recent law review articles dedicated to revealing the real
meaning of the Constitution one could easily conclude that the
number of distinct constitutional theories is directly propor-
tional to the number of professors of constitutional law.'
Yet for all of this proliferation of commentary, we are far
from a consensus on what the Constitution means or even how
to go about determining its meaning. This lack of consensus
transcends mere professional disagreement. Disputes can be
nasty enough even when contained within the academy. But
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1. In one sense, the field of constitutional interpretation very much resem-
bles the logic of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (i.e., one person-one the-
ory).
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constitutional theorists have not always limited their theater of
operations to the pages of scholarly journals. Many of the dis-
putants in these debates have enlisted as aides-de-camp in par-
tisan ideological warfare.
2
Certainly, much of the stridency of the debate can be
attributed to the ever-increasing centrality of the Constitution
in American political discourse.' Advocates of any particular
public policy preference can justify their claim by a variety of
appeals. For example, they might claim that the policy is cost
efficient, or popular, or moral, or consonant with tradition.
They might even claim that it is wise. But if it can be asserted
that the policy is constitutiona, that is all to the better. Such an
assertion immediately elevates the legitimacy of the preference.
To paraphrase Ronald Dworkin, "the Constitution is trumps."4
Hence, debates over constitutional theory seem important
because very different political agendas may be advanced
should one theory gain clear public and professional accep-
tance over others.
Constitutional theory is important for a second reason.
For many members of the legal community it is a critical ele-
ment in what one might call the "myth of jurisprudence." Sim-
ply stated, the "myth" asserts that judges are to be bound by
principles-principles that should be knowable, universal, con-
sistent, and neutral.' The "myth" derives from the need to
2. To illustrate this point one need only note that advocates of some
schools of constitutional interpretation (Gary McDowell, Terry Eastland, Charles
Cooper, Grover Rees to name just a few) have been appointed to positions in
recent Republican administrations. Others have obtained federal judgeships (e.g.,
Antonin Scalia, Robert Bork, William Winter, Richard Posner). Adherents of
competing constitutional theories have correspondingly carried their academic
criticisms into the larger political arena. The nomination of Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court galvanized all of these competing visions. His nomination triggered
scathing criticisms by a number of scholars representing interpretive approaches
antithetical to Bork's, most notably Laurence Tribe (who considered his criticisms
sufficiently important to testify against Bork before the Senate) and Ronald
Dworkin (who carried the battle into the popular press).
3. This reverence for the U.S. Constitution as the core political symbol in
American politics is, in historical terms, a fairly recent development. See M.
KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERI-
CAN CULTURE (1987); Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbo4 30 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1071 (1986).
4. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-103 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959). See also Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978).
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legitimate judging. Why, for example, should anyone accept
the verdict of a court? How can we be certain that a judge is
not merely invoking her own value preferences to decide our
case? The "myth of jurisprudence" assuages some of those
concerns and attaches a certain degree of legitimacy to
judge-made law. That is, if judicial decisions can be made to
appear driven by the "rule of law" rather than human caprice
or ideology, then parties in legal disputes will be more likely to
accept those results as legitimate and, perhaps, even final.
Debates over constitutional theory are in part, then, an
attempt to confirm the validity of the "myth" by demonstrating
that there is one true, legitimate set of principles upon which
the Constitution is based. However, as with the Round Table's
quest for the Holy Grail and Einstein's search for a unifying
theory to explain all of the great forces of the universe, the
interpretation of the Constitution has so far proven elusive
and illusory. Walter Murphy has perhaps said it best: the "root
of the problem of constitutional interpretation lies in the stub-
born refusal of the real world to stand still so that immutable
general principles can have immutable applications to human
behavior. "6
In this article we examine the role that constitutional theo-
ry plays in the jurisprudence of two outspoken and politically
divergent Justices of the United States Supreme Court: William
J. Brennan and William H. Rehnquist. The two do not often
agree on matters of constitutional law. Indeed, it is unlikely
that two more disparate notions of what the Constitution
means have coexisted on the Supreme Court for such an ex-
tended period.7 Political conservatives see Rehnquist as their
judicial champion; liberals equally revere Brennan. As we shall
soon see, those reputations are well-deserved. The more prob-
lematic question here, however, is not whether Brennan and
Rehnquist reach radically different conclusions in constitution-
6. Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation: The A71 of the Historian, Magician, or
Statesman? (Book Review), 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1771 (1978).
7. One indicator of the differences between Brennan and Rehnquist is their
voting. According to Phase I of the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base,
Justice Brennan voted to support a "liberal" outcome in 77.2 percent of the 1,556
cases he participated in which had formal opinions. On the other hand, Justice
Rehnquist voted for the "liberal" outcome in only 19.6 percent of the 1,350 cases
he helped to decide. Segal & Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Buter
Couits: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Projec 73 JUDICATURE 103 (1989).
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al cases. Rather, it is whether or not those differences are de-
rived from different, but principled, constitutional theories.
The question is not a harmless one. Much of the energy and
passion expended on the pursuit of the constitutional theory is
predicated on the notion that jurisprudence matters-that the
very authority and stability of a constitutional system is threat-
ened when judges do not take the Constitution seriously and
use political jurisprudence to subvert principled jurisprudence.
How principled, then, are the constitutional theories of
Rehnquist and Brennan? And, more importantly, do they take
their own theories seriously when deciding constitutional cas-
es?
To assess these questions we first present a distinction
between interpretive constitutional theory and substantive con-
stitutional theory. Second, we show how the very different
sorts of constitutional results attained by Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist are often assumed to proceed from quite different
interpretive grounds. Finally, and most important, we present
a systematic content analysis of the Justices' opinions over a
ten year period (1973-1982) and categorize their different
types of constitutional arguments. This affords a direct and
powerful test of the differences between the two Justices in
their interpretive theories. The results are surprising and at a
minimum provide the most systematic evidence to date of the
relevance of interpretive theory to constitutional rhetoric.
II. THE Two FORMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Much of the confusion surrounding debates over constitu-
tional theory results from the failure to recognize that there
are two different kinds of constitutional theory. On the one
hand, a Justice can strive to develop a substantive under-
standing of what the Constitution means. Such a substantive
constitutional theory should be coherent, consistent, and
well-integrated. As noted below, Justices Rehnquist and
Brennan have substantive constitutional theories that complete-
ly fulfill those criteria. Their theories are at least as sophisticat-
ed and internally consistent as those of any Justice in the
post-War period.
There is, however, another very distinct kind of constitu-
tional theory. Instrumental or interpretive theory is not direct-
ly concerned with what the Constitution means. Instead, it fo-
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cuses on how one should go about ascertaining what it means.
The two kinds of theory are different, though not necessarily
mutually exclusive. A Justice might, for example, resolve consti-
tutional cases in decidedly atheoretical ways, being neither
coherent in substance nor consistent in his mode of interpreta-
tion.' Or a Justice might have a very coherent substantive un-
derstanding of the Constitution, achieving outcomes that are
quite predictable from case to case, and yet not utilize any
consistent interpretive approach in arriving at his conclusions.
"Strong" constitutional theory requires, however, that a Justice
not only develop a firm, sure sense of what the Constitution
means (i.e. substantive theory), but also be able to ground his
conclusions in a well-articulated interpretive theory. A "strong"
theory of the Constitution is especially convincing because its
interpretive validity reinforces its substantive conclusions.
Concern for interpretive theory is far more central to judi-
cial decision making than in most other political arenas. The
policy decisions of legislators and executives may be based on
any of a variety of concerns: their own political values, a desire
to serve their constituents, appeals for party solidarity, interest
group pressures, and strategic judgments vis-a-vis other polit-
ical actors to name just a few. Rarely, however, are they ever
asked to formally explain the principles they applied in reach-
ing those decisions. This is not to suggest that presidents and
members of Congress are "unprincipled." But the legitimacy of
executive and legislative decisions is usually judged by the suc-
cess of the policy outcomes and not by the neatness or coher-
ence of their core principles.
By contrast, decisions of the Supreme Court are usually
justified by elaborate written opinions that announce which liti-
gant has won, establish principles of law binding on all other
American courts, and offer a public rationale for the deci-
sion.' To acquire maximum legitimacy, judicial opinions must
8. Some have suggested that Earl Warren might well fit this categorization.
Anthony Lewis has suggested that Warren's opinions were "unanalytical," uncon-
cerned with "stability, intellectuality [or] craftsmanship," and focused almost entire-
ly on achieving a just result "unencumbered by precedents or conflicting theories."
See Lewis, Earl Wamen, in 4 L. FRIEDMAN AND F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS
2723-24 (1969); Rodell, It Is the Wairen Court, in L. LEVY, THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER EARL WARREN 137-42 (1972).
9. In truth, only Opinions of the Court fulfill the first two functions. But all
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present arguments to the Court's "attentive public" that are
clear and persuasive.'" The standard in constitutional cases is
even higher. The "myth of jurisprudence" insists that the argu-
ments in constitutional cases appear authoritative and com-
manded by some irrefutable reading of the Constitution. It is
not enough for a Justice to explain his vote by claiming, "Well,
that's just how I feel it should turn outl "1 The implementa-
tion of the substantive results of many constitutional disputes
is often advanced (or undermined) by the credibility of the
ways in which a Justice uses interpretive theory in her argu-
ments..
III. BRENNAN V. REHNQUIST: PARTISANS
OF THE CONSTITUTION
We can now take up the question of whether or not
Rehnquist and Brennan exemplify "strong" constitutional theo-
ry. We need to demonstrate (1) that each Justice has a coher-
ent substantive theory of the Constitution, (2) that each Justice
has expressed a clear preference for a particular interpretive
theory, and (3) that there is a tight fit between each Justice's
substantive and interpretive visions-that coherent substantive
outcomes in constitutional cases are achieved by the consistent
application of their own interpretive theory. There is substan-
tial evidence to suggest that the first of these conditions-that
Rehnquist and Brennan represent consistent, albeit different,
substantive visions of the Constitution-is true.
Nearly everyone agrees that William Rehnquist's substan-
tive jurisprudence during his nearly twenty years on the Su-
preme Court has been consistent, so much so that one com-
mentator noted that "[i]f there is virtue in consistency, then
Justice Rehnquist is indeed a virtuous man.' 2 Given a gener-
al description of the facts and the legal questions involved in a
judicial opinions, whether majority, concurring, or dissenting, are characterized by
some degree of justification or appeal to principle.
10. Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court:
Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Cour Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 L. & SoC'Y
REV. 357 (1968).
11. See Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
12. D. BOLES, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUDICIAL ACTIVIST: THE EARLY YEARS
133 (1987).
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particular case, Rehnquist's vote is very predictable. 3 One of
the earliest and best assessments summarized Rehnquist's juris-
prudence in three simple decision rules:
(1) Conflicts between an individual and the government
should, whenever possible, be resolved against the individ-
ual;
(2) Conflicts between state and federal authority...
should, whenever possible, be resolved in favor of the
states; and
(3) Questions of the exercise of federal jurisdiction...
should, whenever possible, be resolved against such exer-
cise. 4
Little has been discovered in recent years to alter
Shapiro's original observations. Powell' 5 and Davis 6 contend
that Rehnquist has developed a theory of "Our Federalism"
that elevates Shapiro's second rule to primary importance. Fiss
and Krauthammer 7 counter that Rehnquist's embrace of fed-
eralism and states' rights is a camouflage for a deeper, equally
consistent support for property rights and laissez-faire econom-
ics-a value that Davis in particular sees as subordinate to
Rehnquist's concerns about federalism. But Riggs and
Proffitt"s confirm Shapiro's initial assessment of Rehnquist's
jurisprudence by noting that in constitutional cases (as opposed
to cases involving statutory interpretation) Rehnquist consis-
tently supports state power (Shapiro's rule #2) and deference
to legislative majorities (Shapiro's rule #1).
All of these studies found consistency in Rehnquist's judi-
cial philosophy by a close reading of his opinions. Analytical
13. This is no small claim. The so-called "swing Justices" on the recent Court
(at various times this group has included Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Stewart,
Powell, White, and even O'Connor and Burger) have often been praised for their
political "judiciousness," but criticized for their lack of principled consistency.
14. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminamy View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293,
294 (1976).
15. Powell, The Compleat Jeffetionian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE
LJ. 1317 (1982).
16. .S. DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 32-37 (1989); Davis,
Federalism and Property Rights: An Examination of Justice Rehnquist's Legal Positivism,
39 W. POL. Q. 250 (1986).
17. Fiss & Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Couir: A Return to the Antebellum Consti-
tution, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1982, at 14.
18. Riggs & Proffitt, The Judicial Philosophy of Justice Rehnquist, 16 AKRON L.
REV. 555 (1983).
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approaches that focus on Rehnquist's votes rather than his
written arguments have reached similar conclusions. Heck has
noted that Rehnquist's "voting record ... is characterized by
almost unstinting hostility to the assertion of civil liberties
claims." 9 Segal has found that Rehnquist will deny almost
every illegal search and seizure claim by a criminal defendant
as a matter of course." Spaeth and Teger have found similar
anti-defendant voting behavior in double jeopardy cases.2 1
Rehnquist also has consistently opposed "liberal" economic
policies and "egalitarian" social policies.
22
Thus, whether we examine what he did (as measured by
his votes in Supreme Court cases) or why he did it (as assessed
by a reading of his written arguments) William Rehnquist
seems to be a Justice with a clear and coherent substantive
constitutional theory-a theory which consistently prefers
law-and-order values over civil liberties values, supports states'
rights in contests with federal power, opposes expansion of
equal protection claims into areas not related to race, and
supports the reasonableness of government actions (especially
state actions) when in conflict with claims of individual rights.
In sum, William Rehnquist consistently reads the Constitution
as expressing support for conservative political values.
2 3
If Rehnquist is, as many argue, the quintessential conserva-
tive jurist, then William Brennan is increasingly portrayed as
one of the few defenders of liberalism of the Supreme Court.
He is, in the eyes of one commentator, the Justice who most
"deserves to be remembered as the cutting edge of Warren
Court liberalism."2 4 Like Rehnquist, Brennan's substantive
19. Heck, Civil Liberties Voting Patterns in the Buger Cour, 1975-1978, 34 W.
POL. Q. 193, 202 (1981); See also Segal & Spaeth, supa note 7.
20. Segal, Supreme Cour Justices as Human Decision Makea: An Individual-Level
Analysis of the Search and Seizure Cases, 48 J. POL. 938 (1986).
21. Spaeth & Teger, Activism and Restraint: A Cloak for the Justices' Policy
Preferences, in SUPREME COURT AcTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 277 (S. Halpern & C.
Lamb 1982).
22. S. GOLDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND ESSAYS 162 (1987); See
also Ducat & Dudley, Dimensions Underlying Economic Policymaking in the Early and
Later Burger Cours, 49 J. POL. 521 (1987); Dudley & Ducat, The Buger Cour and
Economic Liberalism, 39 W. PoL. Q. 236 (1986).
23. This is not to suggest that Rehnquist never varies from these positions.
As noted earlier (see supra note 7) he did support a liberal outcome almost 20%
of the time, though almost always in non-controversial, unanimous decisions.
Instead, the positions identified here are the central tendencies.
24. Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Cour Liberalism, 20 SANTA
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constitutional principles seem to have changed little in his long
tenure on the Court.25 Few who have studied his opinions
would disagree with the following list of Brennan's decision
rules:
(1) The procedural rights of claimants under the due pro-
cess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
should be read as broadly as possible.
(2) The claims of racial and political minorities to legal
remedies under the equal protection clause should be
promoted whenever the state's interest is minimal.
(3) Government regulation of the economy (especially
federal regulation) should be granted wide latitude consis-
tent with basic principles of post-New Deal federalism.
(4) Claims by individuals that a government is interfering
with a right guaranteed by the first amendment should be
resolved by upholding the right in question unless there is
an overwhelming interest on the part of the state.
Several commentators have suggested a few modifications
to this judicial portrait. Both Heck and Ringelstein 6 and
Denvir2 '7 have argued that Brennan's commitment to free
speech and free press claims occasionally turned on whether or
not the speech in question is "political." They assert that
Brennan was less likely (but only by a bit) to protect obscene
and commercial speech and thus was not as absolutist on free
speech as, say, Justice William 0. Douglas. Brennan was also
more sympathetic in recent years to the notion of federalism
as an important protection against encroachments on individu-
al liberty. Generally, he was willing to defer to state courts and
state constitutions whenever they were more favorably inclined
toward civil rights and civil liberties claims than the federal
courts.2 8 But many suspect that his concerns for federalism
CLARA L. REV. 841 (1980).
25. Brennan was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Eisenhower
and took his seat on the bench in October 1956. He retired in 1990.
26. Heck & Ringelstein, The Buiger Court and the Pimacy of Political Expression,
40 W. POL. Q. 413 (1987).
27. Denvir, Justice Brennan, Justice Rehnquist, and Fiee Speech, 80 Nw. U.L. REV.
285 (1985).
28. Corrigan, Justice Bvennan's Philosophy of Federalism, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
149 (1986). See also Brennan's own views on federalism in Brennan, Some Aspects of
Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945 (1964), and more recently in Brennan, State Con-
stitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
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were as much tactical as principled. During the period under
Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist many of Brennan's most
cherished Warren Court doctrines were modified or eviscerat-
ed. Thus, Brennan looked increasingly to the states for pro-
tection of those principles."9 At root, Justice Brennan's consti-
tutional decisions are best explained by his egalitarian senti-
ments and his expansive view of civil liberties, particularly
political freedoms.
Quantitative assessments of Brennan's voting behavior
confirm this view of his substantive constitutional theory. Not
surprisingly, nearly every empirical study of the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts puts Brennan and Rehnquist at opposite
ends of several different value-continua. While Rehnquist near-
ly always opposes free speech claims, Brennan nearly always
supported them."0 While Rehnquist is consistently unsympa-
thetic to defendants' claims based on the exclusionary rule,
Brennan was just as likely to find a constitutional violation.31
Rehnquist routinely votes to deny access to cases making con-
stitutional claims; Brennan just as routinely voted to hear the
substantive merits of those same cases.32 On broad measures
of liberalism on economic matters, egalitarianism in general,
and support for civil liberties Brennan was the Court's most
consistent liberal (in conjunction with Thurgood Marshall)
while Rehnquist remains its most consistent conservative.
IV. THE NOTION OF A LIVING CONSTITUTION:
WILLIAM REHNQUIST ON INTERPRETIVE THEORY
We know that William Rehnquist and William Brennan
represent very different substantive views of the Constitution.
But do they also reflect different interpretive approaches? Su-
preme Court Justices generally have been reticent about dis-
cussing controversial issues in their off-the-bench comments.
29. Friedelbaum, Justice Brennan and the Butger Coun: Policy-making in the
Judicial Thicket, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 188, 209 (1989).
30. See Heck, supra note 19.
31. See Segal, supra note 20.
32. One study has shown how, in recent years, denial of access almost always
has a conservative bias. In effect, denial of access works to prevent far more
liberal-oriented substantive claims from being heard than conservative-oriented
claims. See Rathjen & Spaeth, Denial of Access and Ideological Preferences: An Analysis
of the Voting Behavior of the Butger Coul Justices, 1969-1976, 36 W. POL. Q. 71
(1983).
576 [Vol. 31
1991] THEORY OF REHNQUIST AND BRENNAN 577
But William Rehnquist has on at least one occasion used a
public address as a "bully pulpit" from which to explain his
own theory of constitutional interpretation-and to castigate
what he considered to be illegitimate alternative approaches.
In "The Notion of a Living Constitution""3 Rehnquist took
issue with the claim that the Supreme Court ought to be "the
voice and conscience of contemporary society." 4 This was "a
living Constitution with a vengeance"-an interpretive theory
which, if followed, would destroy the Court's legitimacy. 5 Cit-
ing John Marshall (another "trump" in matters constitutional),
Rehnquist argued that any claim of the judiciary to institution-
al independence must be based on its special responsibility to
safeguard the people's sovereignty as expressed in the Consti-
tution. This was the only justification for permitting an obvi-
ously undemocratic and anti-majoritarian body such as the
Court to exist. Continued tolerance of the judiciary in a repub-
lican society, Rehnquist continued, depended upon a Justice's
commitment to merely "interpreting an instrument framed by
the people." 6 Justices must be detached, objective, and, most
importantly, "should not change the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.""7
Rehnquist conceded that "there is obviously wide room
for honest difference of opinion over the meaning of general
phrases in the Constitution."3 8 But he objected strenuously to
any interpretive theory that was not at all obliged to ground it-
self in the constitutional text or the values of its Founders:
Once we have abandoned the idea that the authority of
the courts to declare laws unconstitutional is somehow tied
to the language of the Constitution that the people adopt-
ed, a judiciary exercising the power of judicial review ap-
pears in a quite different light. Judges then are no longer
keepers of the covenant; instead they are a small group of
fortunately situated people with a roving commission to
second-guess Congress, state legislators, and state and
federal administrative officers concerning what is best for
33. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, ViEws FROM THE BENCH
127, 127-36 (M. Cannon & D. O'Brien 1985).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 128.
36. Id. at 129.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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the country."
Rehnquist offered three additional reasons to challenge
the notion of the "living Constitution" as a legitimate consti-
tutional theory. First, such a view ignored the role of the Con-
stitution as fundamental law. Rehnquist conceded that the
intent of the Framers was not always an appropriate guide for
a world they could not possibly have envisioned. Yet it did not
follow that judges should take responsibility for adapting the
Constitution to an ever-changing nation. Instead, it was clear
that the Founders created a constitutional system granting vast
powers to the President, the Congress, and the states. If there
was to be a "living Constitution," it should live through the
actions of these other institutions. Second, Rehnquist observed
that it was precisely those moments in history when the Court
sought to bring the Constitution into conformity with contem-
porary values that it performed most badly and thus
jeopardized its legitimacy. He offered Dred Scott4° and
Lochner4' as examples of courts unilaterally seeking to place
values into the Constitution (the unalterability of Negro inferi-
ority and the liberty of contract) that were extratextual. Doing
so, even in response to widely-held sentiments of the day, did
the Court and the Constitution much harm. Finally, Rehnquist
conceded that values were a vital part of all political judg-
ments. But he insisted that these value judgments should be
left to the people's representatives except in those cases where
the choice of values was clearly constrained within the textual
Constitution.4"
Rehnquist said little about the importance of constitution-
al doctrine in this address, but remarks made at his original
Senate confirmation hearings in 1973 fill out his interpretive
map. When asked about his views on precedent the nominee
responded that while precedent should be accorded great
weight, it should receive somewhat less weight in the field of
constitutional law than in other areas of the law. What mat-
tered more was the Constitution itself and the values of those
who framed it. By implication, where Court precedents depart-
39. Id. at 130.
40. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
41. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. See Rehnquist, supra note 33, at 131-36.
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ed from those authorities Rehnquist believed that their validity
could be tested anew.4
V. THE IDEAL OF HUMAN DIGNITY: WILLIAM BRENNAN
ON INTERPRETIVE THEORY
The ideological portrait of the Supreme Court changed
much during William Brennan's years on the Court. Where
the dominant coalition for much of the first half of his tenure
was largely liberal and activist (a coalition in which Brennan
himself was an enthusiastic participant), the Court has taken
on a substantially more conservative hue in recent years. That
development surprises no one. Each of the last eight appoint-
ments to the Court has been made by Republican Presidents
committed in principle (if we assume that campaign promises
are principles!) to nominating judges of a more conservative,
less activist bent. Observers disagree about whether this new
coalition has radically transformed and undermined the con-
stitutional values of the Warren Court. But there is little doubt
about Brennan's perception of recent events. His dis-
sents-more numerous and more passionate with each passing
Court term-reflected the views of a Justice fighting a
rearguard action to preserve his hard-won constitutional vision
against the predations of a Court increasingly attracted toward
the constitutional theory of William Rehnquist.
4
For most of his Supreme Court years Brennan's
off-the-bench remarks reflected the sort of safe blandness that
comes with being a spokesman for the prevailing orthodoxy.
But as that orthodoxy has been challenged, both in public
discourse and by many of his more conservative colleagues on
the bench, Brennan's public addresses became more pointed
and more plaintive. The stakes were high. The matter before
the bar was the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking in the Warren
years and, by implication, the legitimacy of his own theory of
constitutional interpretation. As Brennan remarked at the
outset of his Georgetown address, at issue is nothing less than
"my life's work."45
43. See Riggs & Proffitt, supra note 18, at 559.
44. A useful analysis of Justice Brennan's dissents can be found in Ray, Justice
Brennan and theJurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 307 (1988).
45. Presentation of Justice William Brennan, The Constitution of the United
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Brennan's criticism of his critics (principally political con-
servatives and jurisprudential "interpretivists") opened with an
attack on the 'jurisprudence of original intention."46 He as-
serted that an historicist approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion was doomed to futility, noting that "all that can be
gleaned is that the Framers themselves did not agree about the
application or meaning of particular constitutional provisions,
and hid their differences in cloaks of generality."47 If Clio in-
deed spoke with such an unmistakable voice, then, Brennan
suggested, the Constitution should be interpreted by a board
of historians, not a panel of judges. But his criticism did not
end there. Brennan was equally perplexed by the shifting defi-
nition of "Framers" and asked whose intentions were the most
relevant? Were the "Framers" the thirty-eight men who signed
the Philadelphia document, the delegates at the state ratifying
conventions, or the representatives chosen to the First Con-
gress? Brennan concluded with a withering volley: "the idea of
an original intention is [not] a coherent way of thinking about
a jointly drafted document drawing its authority from a gener-
al assent of the states."4"
Brennan then took direct issue with Rehnquist's notion
that the Supreme Court, as an anti-majoritarian institution,
ought not to substitute its own substantive values for those of
elected representatives. Such a reliance on majoritarianism,
according to Brennan, "ultimately will not do."49 Could the
Court, notes Brennan, defer to a legislature determined to
impose an arbitrary social caste system or sponsor a wholesale
confiscation of private property? "One cannot read the text
without admitting that it embodies substantive value choices; it
places ceriain values beyond the power of any legislature."5"
How then did Brennan propose that Justices interpret the
Constitution? His response was considerably more ambiguous
than Rehnquist's:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way
States: Contemporaty Ratification, Georgetown University Text and Teaching Sympo-
sium (Oct. 12, 1985).
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 6.
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we can: as Twentieth Century Americans. We look to the
history of the time of framing and to the intervening histo-
ry of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be,
what do the words of the text mean in our time. For the
genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning
it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in
the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current
problems and current needs. What the constitutional fun-
damentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be
their measure to the vision of our time.51
And what are the "great principles" of the Constitution?
Brennan declined to stipulate all of these principles, preferring
to leave it to judges present and future to interpret the consti-
tutional text through the "internal dialogue of reason and
passion."5' But Brennan offered one "great principle" which
his own internal dialogue had extracted-an "underlying vision
of human dignity" exemplified particularly in the Bill of
Rights.5 Laudable though the notion of "human dignity" is, it
is based on an appeal to values and understandings that are
not self-evident in the constitutional text.54
VI. JUSTIFICATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS:
FIVE TYPES OF INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENTS
As noted earlier there is no shortage of interpretive theo-
ries available to a Supreme Court Justice. Several scholars have
attempted to make some sense of this fertile theoretical land-
scape by categorizing these theories according to the styles of
argument or modes of analysis.55 We have chosen to classify
constitutional arguments by asking the following question: To
what authority does the Justice appeal whenever he makes a
claim in a written opinion?
51. Id. at 7.
52. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and "The Pi-gress of the Law," 10 CARDOZO L.
REv. 3 (1988).
53. Id. at 22.
54. For a detailed illustration of how Brennan employs this notion of "human
dignity" in his constitutional jurisprudence, see Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication
and the Death Penalty: A View From the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313 (1986).
55. See P. BoBmIyr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); Harris, Bonding Word and
Polity: The Logic of Ameican Constitutionalism, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 34 (1982); W.-
MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(1986) [hereinafter MURPHY, FLEMING & HARRIS].
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Textual argument takes as its authority the Constitution
itself and grounds itself in the "plain meaning of the words." It
seeks no other source of authority or validation. A Justice us-
ing textual argument would apply etymology, semantics, and,
most typically, contemporary understandings of constitutional
phrases. Sometimes also referred to as "clause-bound interpre-
tivism"56 this style of argument is best represented by much
of the jurisprudence of Hugo Black. His literal reading of the
First Amendment ("Congress shall make no law... " is arche-
type textual argument.
Historical argument has been the focus of much recent
public and academic controversy. "Intentionalists" maintain
that "the historically demonstrable intentions of the framers
should be binding on contemporary interpreters of the Consti-
tution."57 Supporters of historical argument assert that the
very idea of constitutionalism commands respect for the judg-
ments and values of those who wrote and ratified the Constitu-
tion. Any other approach would break the bond of faith with
the Founders and, more importantly, would allow Justices to
sit as a rump constitutional convention.5" A Justice employing
this type of argument will typically cite debates at the Philadel-
phia Convention, the several state ratifying conventions, the
Federalist essays, or the prevailing political ideas and practices
contemporaneous to the Founding period as authority for his
decision.
Structural argument also gives substantial deference to the
text and history of the Constitution. But instead of focusing on
the meaning of isolated words and phrases of the Constitution,
a structuralist would be more interested in the overall design
and purpose of the constitutional enterprise. 59 No single
56. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1-41 (1980).
57. Powell, The Original Undestanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 886 (1985).
58. It is not our purpose here to document fully the extensive contributions
that historicists have made to the literature on constitutional interpretation. But a
representative sample of such works would surely include R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY (1977); Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Con-
stitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695 (1979); Meese, The Attorney General's View of the
Supreme Court: Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
701 (1985); C. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1982); W. CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953).
59. See, e.g C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw (1969). See also MURPHY, FLEMING & HARRIS, supra note 55; Harris, supra
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clause, for example, independently supports such constitution-
al precepts as separation of powers, checks and balances, or
even federalism. Yet a Justice might well wish to go beyond
such a "clause-bound" approach and find authority for such
principles emanating from several related provisions in the
Constitution. Justice Douglas' discovery of constitutionally pro-
tected zones of privacy in the "penumbras, formed by emana-
tions" from the Bill of Rights is an example of structural ar-
gument.6
0
Doctrinal argument, on the other hand, generally ignores
the text of the Constitution and the intentions of its Framers.
Instead, doctrinal argument derives its authority from a com-
mitment to the "rule of law"-a rule of law constructed from
the body of past judicial decisions. According to this view,
continual reexamination of the Framers' intent or reassess-
ments of the constitutional text deny to constitutional law the
stability and reliability that any legal system requires. Rather
than reinterpret the Constitution de novo in every dispute, a
doctrinalist Justice would rely on established precedents.
6 1
Thus, any time a Justice cites decisions, doctrines, tests, or
rules provided by previous Courts as authority for her opinion
in a given constitutional case we classify it as doctrinal argu-
ment.
Extrinsic argument allows a Justice to move farthest from
the constitutional text in justifying an opinion. Advocates of
extrinsic argument believe that, at root, the activity of judging
involves choosing amongst competing values. They maintain
that values validated by constitutional interpretation (usually
involving some of the hardest choices in society) should not be
defined only by the narrow parameters of legal formalism or
textual exegesis. There is much less agreement among advo-
cates of extrinsic argument, however, as to which structure of
values has the strongest claim to authority. Ely would prefer a
variety of democratic theory he terms "representa-
note 55.
60. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
61. Few commentators have suggested that constitutional interpretation should
derive entirely from this common-law tradition. But several have argued that con-
stitutional precedent occupies a "first position." See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW (1961); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); Wechsler, supra note 5.
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tion-reinforcing;"" Posner has argued that judges should be
more sensitive to considerations of economic utility and mar-
ket rationality; 3 Dworkin, Perry, and Richards, although each
constructs his theory differently, would have judges appeal to
justifications grounded in moral philosophy or rights-based
theories. 4 Others claim that interpretive authority can be dis-
covered as the result of an ongoing conversation within the
legal community.65 Even Alexander Bickel's admonition to
judges to consider the "passive virtues" (that is, to assess the
political consequences of their constitutional interpretations) is
an appeal to extrinsic argument. 66 What is common to all of
these seemingly disparate interpretive theories is that they rely
for their authority on sources or considerations that cannot be
directly linked to the text or structure of the Constitution. 7
In that sense, these are all forms of extrinsic argument.
VII. INTERPRETING INTERPRETIVE THEORY:
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
From their own writings, then, we can say that both
Rehnquist and Brennan have working interpretive theories of
the Constitution-or, to be more precise, that they have a hier-
archy of theories, for neither Justice has committed himself
wholeheartedly to only one interpretive approach. However,
62. ELY, supra note 56, at 87-104.
63. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
64. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); R. DWORKIN, A MAT-
TER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); D. RICHARDS, THE
MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977).
65. See L. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING (1985); Leyh,
Towaid a Constitutional Heimeneutics, 32 AM. J. POL. Sci. 369 (1988); Caret, Compat,
ative Nomnative Henmeneutics: Soipture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 35
(1985).
66. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
67. Some have described the debate over constitutional jurisprudence as one
pitting "interpretivists" (folks who, it is said, "interpret" the Co'nstitution by close
adherence to the constitutional text) versus "noninterpretivists" (folks who, it is
said, are not bound by a strict reading of that text in deciding constitutional
cases). This dichotomy fails on two accounts. First, as we note above there are at
least five different modes of constitutional argument. Others have suggested even
more. But there most certainly are not just two. Second, all of these modes
involve interpretation of the Constitution. What is at issue is not whether the
Constitution should be interpreted, but rather what kinds of analysis and justifi-
cation are most legitimate in the interpretive process.
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each Justice has been willing to assert that certain approaches
are intrinsically more authoritative than others. Textual and
historical argument are the rhetorical weapons of choice for
Rehnquist. When those sources are ambiguous or unavailable,
structural argument can be used. Doctrinal argument can be
appropriate when the first three, more preferred, approaches
produce uncertainty. But standing precedent can be chal-
lenged if the Constitution "commands" it (i.e. when established
doctrine cannot be squared with the text or the intention of its
Framers). Extrinsic argument seems unacceptable to Rehnquist
in all circumstances. Brennan, on the other hand, is more
skeptical of historical approaches than Rehnquist. He has con-
ceded that history and text must be part of the mix that a
Supreme Court judge considers, but he is clearly committed to
certain values of equality and "human dignity" that are
extratextual. Extrinsic argument is thus not only acceptable,
but in some circumstances is essential to interpreting the Con-
stitution in a meaningful way.
Here again Justices Brennan and Rehnquist occupy posi-
tions that are almost diametrically opposed. Just as their sub-
stantive theories of the Constitution differ dramatically, so too
do their interpretive theories. On the surface this seems to
confirm the widely-held view that interpretive theory matters.
That is, judges who adopt one kind of interpretive approach
will be "compelled" by that approach to arrive at particular
results. Or, to put it another way, a different set of public poli-
cies will "win" if a judge uses an historicist interpretive ap-
proach than if he consistently pursues extrinsic argument.6"
But this assumption begs a most important question. Do
Rehnquist and Brennan actually live up to the canons of their
self-professed interpretive theories? Do they do, in constitu-
tional cases, what they say they should do? Systematic content
analysis is a particularly useful approach for examining this
question.
Content analysis is not new to legal scholarship. Many
68. It is tempting to say for the post-New Deal Court that textualism and
historicism are constitutional theories most favored by conservatives, while liberals
are more inclined toward extrinsic argument. Here, certainly, the more conserva-
tive Justice (Rehnquist) and the more liberal Justice (Brennan) each publicly
endorse the interpretive theories that such a model predicts. But for reasons that
will become apparent later we are unwilling to accept this notion.
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scholars search for recurring themes or common rhetorical
devices in written opinions. But most of these studies are not
systematic. For example, while researcher X may have conclud-
ed after a careful reading of Justice Z's opinions that Z's juris-
prudence is "twitterpated," those findings can often be chal-
lenged on at least two counts. First, X may have biased those
findings by a selective reading of the record (the problem of
anecdotalism). Second, researcher Y may have reached a differ-
ent conclusion than X (that Z's jurisprudence was "pixillated"
rather than "twitterpated") while looking at much the same
record. Yet there are usually no commonly acknowledged crite-
ria by which to determine whether X or Y's interpretation is
the more correct (the problem of reliability).
The systematic content analysis utilized here differs from
such approaches because it provides more rigorous procedures
for obtaining reliable or reproducible data. To counter the
problem of anecdotalism we examined all of the opinions of
Justices Rehnquist and Brennan in constitutional cases over a
ten-year period (1973-1982). We make no judgments as to
which cases or opinions are more "important;" all of the writ-
ten opinions are treated equally. To counter the problem of
reliability we have established procedures for coding constitu-
tional arguments that are intersubjectively verifiable. 69
Rather than categorize an entire opinion as utilizing one
form of argument or another we focus on each paragraph of
an opinion as our unit of analysis. By the conventions of Eng-
lish usage a paragraph should be thematically unified and ex-
press one central idea. Many of us violate this convention re-
peatedly and without remorse. But while legal language is
many things, it is certainly formal. As such, we expect Justices
69. Thie statistic used for confirming reliability across a three-coder panel is
pi. This is the most appropriate statistic because of the nominal nature of the
coding categories. See K. KRIPPENDORF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ITS METHODOLOGY 133-54 (1980).
The procedures for this type of content analysis can be costly because the
coding rules must be pre-tested and the rules and procedures modified if reliable
data are not obtained on a subset of the entire universe of cases. After two
pre-tests on a randomly selected subset of the cases the reliability statistic reached
conventional levels of acceptance. This means that the classification process can be
replicated and the data represent variations in real phenomena. This is not to
stress the "objective" character of the classification but only to emphasize that
other analysts using these same protocols will reach identical or very similar con-
clusions about the type of argument embodied in any given paragraph.
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will use only one mode of argument in any given paragraph,
or that one particular type of argument will be the central
thrust of a paragraph. Examining each paragraph in an opin-
ion offers other advantages as well. If a Justice uses more than
one mode of argument in a case, then paragraph-by-paragraph
analysis is more sensitive to those differences. It also enables
us to avoid the pitfall of treating summary opinions of one or
two paragraphs in the same way as much longer opinions in
which arguments are more fully developed. Finally, paragraphs
are a common unit of analysis in communication research in-
volving written texts.7 °
To determine whether a case involves a constitutional
question we have employed the West keynote system as used
in the Supreme Court Reporter. If a case is identified in a West
headnote as addressing an issue of constitutional law, or if the
headnote makes reference to any provision in the Constitution
or its Amendments, then it is included in our study.7' All
written opinions in these constitutional cases, whether they are
majority, dissenting, or concurring, are included. Excluded are
dissents from memoranda decisions, denials of certiorari, and
opinions written by Rehnquist or Brennan while sitting as Cir-
cuit Justices.
The content analysis required three coders to indepen-
dently assign each paragraph from those opinions to one of
seven categories. Five of those categories represent the modes
of constitutional argument discussed earlier: textual, historical,
structural, doctrinal, and extrinsic.7" Two additional catego-
ries were needed. Many opinions, particularly those written for
the Court, include paragraphs that discuss the facts of the case
and its litigation history. Such paragraphs are classified as state-
ment of the facts. In addition, opinions written in constitutional
cases also often include arguments and discussions that are
70. Id. at 105-08.
71. The West Publishing Company uses a panel of experts in assigning its
headnotes. This group decision process does not guarantee the degree of reliabil-
ity present in our content analysis of the opinions themselves, but it is decidedly
more reliable than the judgments of a single individual.
72. A complete description of the protocols that were used to assign para-
graphs to each of the categories is not included here because it is quite lengthy.
They are described fully in G. Phelps and J. Gates, Judicial Opinions and Juiispru-
dential Approaches: A Content Analysis, paper presented to the Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association (Sept. 1-4, 1989).
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unrelated to the constitutional matters at hand. These para-
graphs might deal with matters of statutory construction, or
rules of procedure, or administrative law. These are classified
as nonconstitutional argument. This distinction is important be-
cause this study is only interested in constitutional argument.
VIII. THE INTERPRETIVE MAP OF THE JUSTICES
Between 1973 and 1982 Justice Rehnquist wrote opinions
in 251 constitutional cases;Justice Brennan wrote in 276 cases.
These opinions produced 8368 paragraphs which were content
analyzed by the three-person panel of coders. 73 The coding
protocols generated data that are sufficiently reliable to sug-
gest that the categories used make sense.74 What can we learn
about the nature of these two judges' constitutional jurispru-
dence? Has each adhered to the interpretive theories that each
advocated? Have they exhibited the sort of consistency in their
interpretive approaches that would suggest evidence of a
"strong" constitutional theory?
Table 1 displays the results for all categories of argument.
First of all, one cannot help but note the proportion of the
rhetoric in constitutional cases that does not engage in consti-
tutional argument. About half of all the paragraphs either dis-
cuss the facts of the case or deal with matters other than con-
stitutional interpretation. Not surprisingly, a substantial por-
tion of almost any Opinion of the Court is spent discussing the
history of the litigation, setting out the facts of the case, and
structuring the issues to facilitate analysis. Moreover, many
cases dealing with constitutional questions also involve corol-
lary statutory questions. 75 Because of the volume of factual
73. The coders included the authors and a graduate assistant who had a
background in constitutional law.
74. In a more technical sense, this means that the data is replicable. The
three coders were unanimous in their assignments of paragraphs to particular cat-
egories 82.1% of the time. The pi coefficient (the most common measure of
intercoder reliability) among the coders was 0.741. Communications researchers
usually insist on a minimum of 0.6 for pi. Thus the content analysis used here is
reliable by conventional standards.
75. As an example, we noted a number of discrimination cases iii which
justices moved back and forth between consideration of the Equal Protection
Clause (constitutional argument) and interpretation of the various Civil Rights Acts
(arguments that focus on statutory rather than constitutional matters).
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TABLE 1
TYPE OF ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES BY
JUSTICES BRENNAN AND REHNQUIST.
(n=paragraphs)
Type of Argument
























































Average Percentage of Agreement = 81.9%
Pi = 0.877
n = 8368
and non-constitutional argument displayed in Table 1 there is
a real risk that those numbers will distort any potentially sig-
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nificant differences in the kinds of constitutional arguments
used by the Justices. Table 2, therefore, arrays only the data
related to constitutional argument. 6
Several observations are immediately apparent:
1. The dominant mode of constitutional argument for
both Rehnquist and Brennan is doctrinal. On the one hand,
this shouldn't surprise us. Stare decisis is a root principle of the
common law tradition. Much of a judge's legal training and
experience is dedicated to inculcating a healthy regard for
precedent. Grounding one's claims in past precedents is also a
relatively safe route to travel. Judges who immerse their argu-
ment in precedent are perceived as possessing the proper 'ju-
dicial temperament." More to the point, the corpus of case law
is so vast and diverse that judges with very different substan-
tive theories of the Constitution can make equally persuasive
appeals to the same body of precedent in obtaining those dif-
ferent results.
The negligible difference between Rehnquist and Brennan
in their willingness to use doctrinal argument is, nonetheless,
striking. After all, the history of the Supreme Court in the
twenty or so years prior to Rehnquist's arrival had been
marked by results that were much more congruent with Justice
Brennan's substantive vision than with Rehnquist's. We might
expect, therefore, that consistent appeals to doctrinal argu-
ment should give an advantage to outcomes favored by
Brennan. Moreover, Rehnquist has gone on record as express-
ing a willingness to ignore precedent when the text, history, or
structure of the Constitution commanded it. (The veiled asser-
tion here, of course, was that Rehnquist would be willing to
aggressively challenge liberal precedents wherever the constitu-
tional assumptions on which they were based appeared
"soft")." On his self-professed continuum of interpretive the-
ory, arguments drawn from doctrine clearly have a lesser claim
76. There was some concern that our data might be skewed artificially by our
practice of coding every paragraph without regard for length. That is, a four-page
paragraph with a dozen or more case citations and lengthy footnotes was treated
no differently from a one-sentence paragraph on the order of "We respectfully
dissent." They each would have been counted as one paragraph. Hence, we
instituted a second level of analysis in which we weighted each paragraph by the
number of printed lines it contained. Those weighted percentages are virtually
indistinguishable from the data reported in Tables I and 2.
77. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 2
TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL












































than historical, textual, or structural arguments. Despite these
expectations Rehnquist actually grounds his constitutional
opinions in doctrine more than twenty times as often as he ap-
peals to either history or text or structuralism.
2. Neither Rehnquist nor Brennan employ textual, histor-
ical, or structural argument to any great extent and they do
not differ substantially in their level of use of these types of
argument. The historical mode of argument is in many ways at
the core of the debates over the role of interpretive theory in
Supreme Court decisionmaking. Advocates and critics of
historicism represent seemingly irreconcilable approaches to
constitutional interpretation. Yet the difference in the two
Justices' use of historical arguments is so small as to be statisti-
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cally insignificant.
Like his hero Cardozo, Brennan concedes that the history
and text of the Constitution are important contextual elements
to be considered in judging. But in his Georgetown speech
Brennan adamantly argued that "clause-bound" historicism was
both impractical and unwise.78 Hence, his reluctance to rely
on these sorts of arguments in his opinions is predictable.
Rehnquist is another story. Taken together, textual, historical,
and structural approaches account for little more than 10% of
Rehnquist's constitutional argument despite his purported
preference for these modes of analysis. A number of factors
might explain this anomaly. Rehnquist may believe that resort
to these approaches is appropriate only when existing prece-
dents are based on a "clear mistake" by an earlier Court. He
may be selective regarding the kinds of substantive issues in
which he invokes "interpretivist" approaches, reserving those
kinds of argument for when he wishes to challenge prevailing
orthodoxy (for example, much has been made of his historical
arguments in establishment cases and his structural arguments
in federalism cases), but holding them in abeyance on issues
less central to his substantive vision of the Constitution. What-
ever the explanation(s), it is clear that there is a wide gap be-
tween Rehnquist's publicly proffered interpretive theory and
his actual jurisprudence in constitutional cases.
3. Extrinsic argument is the second most common inter-
pretive approach used by Justices Rehnquist and Brennan in
constitutional cases, and Rehnquist is about as likely to uti-
lize extrinsic argument as is Brennan. These results are in
some respects the most curious of all. The widest gulf between
Rehnquist's "Living Constitution" address and Brennan's
Georgetown speech is precisely over the matter of extrinsic
argument. Rehnquist finds no place whatsoever for it in consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Brennan just as adamantly believes that
without consideration of important extratextual values the
Constitution would write only with the "dead hand of the
past." Yet there is no substantial difference between the two
Justices in their willingness to resort to extrinsic argument!
They each invoke extrinsic argument about 19% of the time in
their constitutional opinions. For Rehnquist these results are
78. Brennan, supra note 45.
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remarkable indeed. He calls upon extrinsic argument nearly
twice as often as historical, textual, and structural argument
combined. It would seem that the notion of a living Constitu-
tion is alive in William Rehnquist's jurisprudence, despite his
assertions to the contrary.
In at least one important sense, though, it is possible that
our analysis might have failed to recognize important differ-
ences in the interpretive approaches of these two Justices. Ma-
jority opinions differ from non-majority (dissenting and con-
curring) opinions in a couple of important ways. When writing
for the Court, a Justice must often consider the views of other
coalition members. The author may have to include the ideas
of other Justices in order to bring them into the majority, or
may have to modify his own presentation to prevent defec-
tions.79 As a result, majority opinions are often corporate
efforts in which the interpretive preferences of the author
become substantially diffused. 0 In a dissent or concurrence,
though, a Justice needs to speak for no one but himself. Pre-
cisely because such opinions are not law, we might expect
Rehnquist and Brennan to give freer voice to their preferred
modes of constitutional interpretation.8' Table 3 shows the
distribution of constitutional arguments by Rehnquist and
Brennan in both majority and non-majority opinions.
4. There are marginal differences in the sorts of consti-
tutional arguments employed by Rehnquist and Brennan in
their non-majority opinions, but none of the differences is
substantial. Once again, the notion that Rehnquist and
Brennan express very different interpretive approaches to the
Constitution proves unconvincing. Even in these most
personalistic kinds of opinions the two Justices differ very little
in their choice of interpretive approaches. Brennan was not
much more likely to use extrinsic arguments than Rehnquist
(in fact, he used extrinsic argument slightly less often than
79. See W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); Howard, On the
Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 43 (1968).
80. A famous illustration, apocryphal though it may be, of the corporate
quality of majority opinions is Woodward and Armstrong's account of Warren
Burger's "opinion" in U.S. v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). They suggest that
Burger's contribution to that opinion amounted to little more than the introduc-
tion. The rest was the work of other Justices. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG,
THE BRETHREN 314-47 (1979).
81. A. BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR 3-21 (1974).
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TABLE 3
TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT BY TYPE OF OPINION
Type of Argument Majority Opinions Non-Majority Opinions
Brennan Rehnquist Brennan Rehnquist
Textual 1.11% 3.70% 1.99% 3.64%
(8) (38) (26) (39)
(Z=3.68; p>0.001) (Z=2.39; p>0.02)
Historical 3.34 2.92 1.91 3.45
(24) (30) (24) (37)
(Z=0.49; p>0.62) (Z=2.29; p>0.02)
Structural 2.09 2.53 2.06 3.48
(15) (26) (27) (47)
(Z=0.61; p>0.5 4 ) (Z=2.08; p>0.04 )
Doctrinal 81.34 80.25 70.97 62.22
(584) (825) (929) (667)
(Z=0.57; p>0.56 ) (Z=4.51; p>0.0001)
Extrinsic 12.12 10.60 23.07 26.30
(87) (109) (302) (282)
(Z=0.98; p>0.3 3 ) (Z=1.82; p>0.0 7 )
TOTAL 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(718) (1309) (1028) (1072)
Rehnquist); Rehnquist was not much more likely to appeal to
historical justifications than was Brennan. There are ten pos-
sible points where we can compare the respective interpretive
approaches of the two Justices. 2  Yet none of these
comparison-pairs reveals any substantial differences."3
82. There are ive different categories of constitutional argunent (textual, his-
torical, structural, doctrinal, and extrinsic) and two different kinds of opinions
(majority and non-majority). This produces ten different comparison-pairs. For
example, we can compare Rehnquist and Brennan with respect to each Justice's
use of doctrinal argument in their majority opinions; or each Justice's use of
extrinsic argument in their non-majority opinions.
83. Tests for statistical significance answer only one question: whether the
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Given the length of the period under study (ten years) and
the thousands of paragraphs that were analyzed, it is quite
striking that the differences in the constitutional arguments
employed by Rehnquist and Brennan are so very small. This is
thin stuff, indeed, on which to build the case that Brennan and
Rehnquist represent different interpretive approaches in their
constitutional jurisprudence.
IX. CONCLUSION: DOES INTERPRETIVE THEORY MATrER?
William Rehnquist and William Brennan represent very
different substantive visions of the Constitution. Moreover,
they have each expressed a preference for a particular inter-
pretive approach in deciding constitutional cases. It is tempt-
ing to suggest that each Justice, therefore, represents a differ-
ent kind of "strong" constitutional theory-that Rehnquist's
preference for an historical-textual approach to interpretation
is linked with his support for conservative outcomes in consti-
tutional cases, while Brennan's support for extrinsic kinds of
argument is linked to his constitutional liberalism. These data
show no such linkage. Each Justice used a variety of arguments
in justifying his opinions. And those different kinds of argu-
ments were utilized by each Justice to about the same degree.
Neither Rehnquist nor Brennan consistently adhered to any
one particular interpretive theory (much less adhering to the
theories each has publicly endorsed.)
These data raise important questions about the relevance
of interpretive constitutional theory to the real world of judg-
ing. If we cannot find any substantial differences between the
kinds of arguments employed by Rehnquist and
Brennan-polar opposites in terms of their substantive under-
standings of the Constitution-then are we likely to find such
differences between any other Justices? If a clear, consistent
interpretive theory of the Constitution cannot be discovered in
variation between A and B is statistically significant. It either is or it isn't. In this
instance, there ave statistically significant differences between several of these
comparison-pairs. But the differences in those percentages (for example, the
difference between Brennan's and Rehnquist's use of historical argument in
non-majority opinions is 1.54%-a difference that is significant statistically speaking)
are just too insubstantial to offer much encouragement for those who wish to
maintain that Rehnquist or Brennan exhibit clear and distinctive interpretive
theories.
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the jurisprudence of either of these two ideologically disparate
Justices, then are we likely to find clear, consistent interpretive
constitutional theory anywhere on the Court? If we cannot,
from the texture of their own arguments, take these two Jus-
tices at their word when each claims that there is a "proper"
way to read and interpret a constitution, then can we take
seriously the claim of any Justice that he or she reached a par-
ticular outcome by the command of the law rather than by the
predilection of their politics?
The idea that judicial decisionmaking is a principled activi-
ty is central to the notion of the rule of law and also to most
theories of constitutional jurisprudence. When we examine
these two Justices at their words, however, we find that the
type of arguments used to support a particular position are
remarkably similar and of little difference in a statistical sense.
We suspect, in fact, that Justices invoke particular interpretive
approaches only when those approaches converge with their
substantive understanding of the Constitution. 4 These results
must be disquieting for those who continue to debate the im-
portance of interpretive theories to the constitutional adjudica-
tion of the Supreme Court.
84. This observation admittedly goes beyond the issues addressed in this
study. We are, after all, talking only about two Justices. Moreover, it is important
to note that our analysis gauges only the constitutional thetolic of tile Justices.
These data do not address the question of precisely what factor(s) controlled the
Justices' decisions. Nevertheless, these data are clearly compatible with the growing
body of literature on the centrality of political ideology in judicial decisionmaking.
See Segal & Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U. S. Supirme Court Justices, 83
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 557 (1989).
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